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S O C I A L S C I E N C E
Genesis of Suicide Terrorism
Scott Atran
Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed
cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recent
research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and
economically well-off as surrounding populations. A ﬁrst line of defense is to get the
communities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how to
minimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.
A ccording to the U.S. Department ofState report Patterns of Global Ter-rorism 2001 (1), no single definition
of terrorism is universally accepted; however,
for purposes of statistical analysis and policy-
making: “The term ‘terrorism’ means pre-
meditated, politically motivated violence per-
petrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience.” Of
course, one side’s “terrorists” may well be
another side’s “freedom fighters” (Fig. 1).
For example, in this definition’s sense, the
Nazi occupiers of France rightly denounced
the “subnational” and “clandestine” French
Resistance fighters as terrorists. During the
1980s, the International Court of Justice used
the U.S. Administration’s own definition of
terrorism to call for an end to U.S. support for
“terrorism” on the part of Nicaraguan Contras
opposing peace talks.
For the U.S. Congress, “‘act of terrorism’
means an activity that—(A) involves a vio-
lent act or an act dangerous to human life that
is a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping.” (2). When suitable, the defini-
tion can be broadened to include states hostile
to U.S. policy.
Apparently, two official definitions of ter-
rorism have existed since the early 1980s:
that used by the Department of State “for
statistical and analytical purposes” and that
used by Congress for criminal proceedings.
Together, the definitions allow great flexibil-
ity in selective application of the concept of
terrorism to fluctuating U.S. priorities. The
special category of “State-sponsored terror-
ism” could be invoked to handle some issues
(3), but the highly selective and politically
tendentious use of the label terrorism would
continue all the same. Indeed, there appears
to be no principled distinction between “ter-
ror” as defined by the U.S. Congress and
“counterinsurgency” as allowed in U.S.
armed forces manuals (4).
Rather than attempt to produce a stipu-
lative and all-encompassing definition of
terrorism, this arti-
cle restricts its focus
to “suicide terror-
ism” characterized
as follows: the tar-
geted use of self-de-
structing humans
against noncomba-
tant—typically ci-
vilian—populations
to effect political
change. Although a
suicide attack aims
to physically destroy
an initial target, its
primary use is typi-
cally as a weapon of
psychological war-
fare intended to af-
fect a larger public
audience. The pri-
mary target is not
those actually killed
or injured in the at-
tack, but those made to witness it. The
enemy’s own information media amplify
the attack’s effects to the larger target pop-
ulation. Through indoctrination and train-
ing and under charismatic leaders, self-
contained suicide cells canalize disparate
religious or political sentiments of individ-
uals into an emotionally bonded group of
fictive kin who willfully commit to die
spectacularly for one another and for what
is perceived as the common good of alle-
viating the community’s onerous political
and social realities.
Recent History
Suicide attack is an ancient practice with a
modern history (supporting online text). Its
use by the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicari) in
Roman-occupied Judea and by the Islamic
Order of Assassins (hashashin) during the
early Christian Crusades are legendary ex-
amples (5). The concept of “terror” as sys-
tematic use of violence to attain political
ends was first codified by Maximilien
Robespierre during the French Revolution.
He deemed it an “emanation of virtue” that
delivers “prompt, severe, and inflexible”
justice, as “a consequence of the general
principle of democracy applied to our coun-
try’s most pressing needs.” (6 ). The Reign
of Terror, during which the ruling Jacobin
faction exterminated thousands of potential
enemies, of whatever sex, age, or condi-
tion, lasted until Robespierre’s fall ( July
1794). Similar justification for state-spon-
sored terror was common to 20th-century
revolutions, as in Russia (Lenin), Cambo-
dia (Pol Pot), and Iran (Khomeini).
Whether subnational (e.g., Russian anar-
chists) or state-supported (e.g., Japanese ka-
mikaze), suicide attack as a weapon of terror
is usually chosen by weaker parties against
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Fig. 1. Chanting demonstrators in Pakistan-held Kashmir defending
Osama bin Laden’s actions and ambitions as freedom-ﬁghting (Novem-
ber 2001). [AP Photo/Roshan Mugal]
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materially stronger foes when fighting meth-
ods of lesser cost seem unlikely to succeed.
Choice is often voluntary, but typically under
conditions of group pressure and charismatic
leadership. Thus, the kamikaze (“divine
wind”) first used in the battle of the Philip-
pines (November 1944) were young, fairly
well educated pilots who understood that pur-
suing conventional warfare would likely end
in defeat. When collectively asked by Adm.
Takijiro Onishi to volunteer for “special at-
tack” (tokkotai) “transcending life and
death,” all stepped forward, despite assuranc-
es that refusal would carry no shame or pun-
ishment. In the Battle of Okinawa (April
1945) some 2000 kamikaze rammed fully
fueled fighter planes into more than 300
ships, killing 5000 Americans in the most
costly naval battle in U.S. history. Because of
such losses, there was support for using the
atomic bomb to end World War II (7).
The first major contemporary suicide
terrorist attack in the Middle East was the
December 1981 destruction of the Iraqi
embassy in Beirut (27 dead, over 100
wounded). Its precise authors are still un-
known, although it is likely that Ayatollah
Khomeini approved its use by parties spon-
sored by Iranian intelligence. With the as-
sassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese Presi-
dent Bashir Gemayel in September 1982,
suicide bombing became a strategic politi-
cal weapon. Under the pro-Iranian Leba-
nese Party of God (Hezbollah), this strategy
soon achieved geopolitical effect with the
October 1983 truck-bomb killing of nearly
300 American and French servicemen.
American and France abandoned the mul-
tinational force policing Lebanon. By 1985,
these attacks arguably led Israel to cede
most of the gains made during its 1982
invasion of Lebanon.
In Israel-Palestine, suicide terrorism be-
gan in 1993, with attacks by Hezbollah-
trained members of the Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas) and Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) aimed at derailing the Oslo
Peace Accords (8). As early as 1988, how-
ever, PIJ founder Fathi Shiqaqi established
guidelines for “exceptional” martyrdom op-
erations involving human bombs. He fol-
lowed Hezbollah in stressing that God ex-
tols martyrdom but abhors suicide: “Allah
may cause to be known those who believe
and may make some of you martyrs, and
Allah may purify those who believe and
may utterly destroy the disbelievers”; how-
ever, “no one can die except by Allah’s
leave” (9, 10) (Fig. 2).
The recent radicalization and networking
through Al-Qaida of militant Islamic groups
from North Africa, Arabia, and Central and
Southeast Asia stems from the Soviet-Afghan
War (1979–1989). With financial backing from
the United States, members of these various
groups were provided opportunities to pool and
to unify doctrine, aims, training, equipment,
and methods, including suicide attack. Through
its multifaceted association with regional
groups (by way of finance, personnel, and lo-
gistics), Al-Qaida aims to realize flexibly its
global ambition of destroying Western domi-
nance through local initiatives to expel Western
influences (11). According to Jane’s Intelli-
gence Review: “All the suicide terrorist groups
have support infrastructures in Europe and
North America.” (12).
Calling the current wave of radical Is-
lam “fundamentalism” (in the sense of “tra-
ditionalism”) is misleading, approaching an
oxymoron (supporting online text).
Present-day radicals, whether Shi’ite (Iran,
Hezbollah) or Sunni (Taliban, Al-Qaida),
are much closer in spirit and action to
Europe’s post-Renaissance Counter-Refor-
mation than to any traditional aspect of
Moslem history. The idea of a ruling eccle-
siastical authority, a state or national coun-
cil of clergy, and a religious police devoted
to physically rooting out heretics and blas-
phemers has its clearest historical model in
the Holy Inquisition. The idea that religion
must struggle to assert control over politics
is radically new to Islam (13).
Dubious Public Perceptions
Recent treatments of Homeland Security re-
search concentrate on how to spend billions to
protect sensitive installations from attack (14,
15). But this last line of defense is probably
easiest to breach because of the multitude of
vulnerable and likely targets (in-
cluding discotheques, restau-
rants, and malls), the abundance
of would-be attackers (need-
ing little supervision once em-
barked on a mission), the rel-
atively low costs of attack
(hardware store ingredients,
no escape needs), the difficul-
ty of detection (little use of
electronics), and the unlikeli-
hood that attackers would di-
vulge sensitive information
(being unaware of connec-
tions beyond their operational
cells). Exhortations to put
duct tape on windows may as-
suage (or incite) fear, but will
not prevent massive loss of
life, and public realization of
such paltry defense can under-
mine trust. Security agencies
also attend to prior lines of
defense, such as penetrating
agent-handling networks of
terrorist groups, with only in-
termittent success.
A first line of defense is to
prevent people from becoming
terrorists. Here, success appears
doubtful should current govern-
ment and media opinions about
why people become human
bombs translate into policy (see
also supporting online text on
contrary academic explanations).
Suicide terrorists often are labeled crazed cow-
ards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in
the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvi-
ous course becomes to hunt down terrorists
while simultaneously transforming their sup-
porting cultural and economic environment
from despair to hope. What research there is,
however, indicates that suicide terrorists have
no appreciable psychopathology and are at least
as educated and economically well off as their
surrounding populations.
Psychopathology: A Fundamental
Attribution Error
U.S. President George W. Bush initially
branded 9/11 hijackers “evil cowards.” For
U.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive as-
saults on terrorists and those supporting ter-
rorism are justified because: “Those who
would commit suicide in their assaults on the
free world are not rational and are not de-
terred by rational concepts” (16). In attempt-
ing to counter anti-Moslem sentiment, some
Fig. 2.Wreckage in Gaza after an Israeli attack that killed Salah
Shehadeh, Hamas military commander. It features the green
Hamas ﬂag, and Arabic grafﬁti reads: “We are resisters, death
in the way of Allah is the life.” [AP Photo/Adel Hana]
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groups advised their members to respond that
“terrorists are extremist maniacs who don’t
represent Islam at all” (17).
Social psychologists have investigated the
“fundamental attribution error,” a tendency for
people to explain behavior in terms of individ-
ual personality traits, even when significant sit-
uational factors in the larger society are at work.
U.S. government and media characterizations
of Middle East suicide bombers as craven ho-
micidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamental
attribution error: No instances of religious or
political suicide terrorism stem from lone ac-
tions of cowering or unstable bombers.
Psychologist Stanley Milgram found that
ordinary Americans also readily obey destruc-
tive orders under the right circumstances (18).
When told by a “teacher” to administer poten-
tially life-threatening electric shocks to “learn-
ers” who fail to memorize word pairs, most
comply. Even when subjects stressfully protest
as victims plead and scream, use of extreme
violence continues—not because of murderous
tendencies but from a sense of obligation in
situations of authority, no matter how trite. A
legitimate hypothesis is that apparently extreme
behaviors may be elicited and rendered com-
monplace by particular historical, political, so-
cial, and ideological contexts.
With suicide terrorism, the attributional
problem is to understand why nonpathologi-
cal individuals respond to novel situational
factors in numbers sufficient for recruiting
organizations to implement policies. In the
Middle East, perceived contexts in which
suicide bombers and supporters express
themselves include a collective sense of his-
torical injustice, political subservience, and
social humiliation vis-a`-vis global powers
and allies, as well as countervailing religious
hope (supporting online text on radical Is-
lam’s historical novelty). Addressing such
perceptions does not entail accepting them as
simple reality; however, ignoring the causes
of these perceptions risks misidentifying
causes and solutions for suicide bombing.
There is also evidence that people tend
to believe that their behavior speaks for
itself, that they see the world objectively,
and that only other people are biased and
misconstrue events (19). Moreover, indi-
viduals tend to misperceive differences be-
tween group norms as more extreme than
they really are. Resulting misunderstand-
ings— encouraged by religious and ideo-
logical propaganda—lead antagonistic
groups to interpret each other’s views of
events, such as terrorism/freedom-fighting,
as wrong, radical, and/or irrational. Mutual
demonization and warfare readily ensue.
The problem is to stop this spiral from
escalating in opposing camps (Fig. 3).
Poverty and Lack of Education Are
Not Reliable Factors
Across our society, there is wide consensus
that ridding society of poverty rids it of crime
(20). According to President Bush, “We fight
poverty because hope is the answer to ter-
ror. . . . We will challenge the poverty and
hopelessness and lack of education and failed
governments that too often allow conditions
that terrorists can seize” (21). At a gathering
of Nobel Peace Prize laureates, South Afri-
ca’s Desmond Tutu and South Korea’s Kim
Dae Jong opined, “at the bottom of terrorism
is poverty”; Elie Wiesel and the Dalai Lama
concluded, “education is the way to eliminate
terrorism” (22).
Support for this comes from research pi-
oneered by economist Gary Becker showing
that property crimes are predicted by poverty
and lack of education (23). In his incentive-
based model, criminals are rational individu-
als acting on self-interest. Individuals choose
illegal activity if rewards exceed probability
of detection and incarceration together with
expected loss of income from legal activity
(“opportunity costs”). Insofar as criminals
lack skill and education, as in much blue-
collar crime, opportunity costs may be mini-
mal; so crime pays.
Such rational-choice theories based on
economic opportunities do not reliably ac-
count for some types of violent crimes (do-
mestic homicide, hate killings). These calcu-
lations make even less sense for suicide ter-
rorism. Suicide terrorists generally are not
lacking in legitimate life opportunities rela-
tive to their general population. As the Arab
press emphasizes, if martyrs had nothing to
lose, sacrifice would be senseless (24): “He
who commits suicide kills himself for his
own benefit, he who commits martyrdom
sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion
and his nation. . . . The Mujahed is full of
hope” (25).
Research by Krueger and Maleckova sug-
gests that education may be uncorrelated, or
even positively correlated, with supporting ter-
rorism (26). In a December 2001 poll of 1357
West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 18 years of
age or older, those having 12 or more years of
schooling supported armed attacks by 68
points, those with up to 11 years of schooling
by 63 points, and illiterates by 46 points. Only
40% of persons with advanced degrees support-
ed dialogue with Israel versus 53% with college
degrees and 60% with 9 years or less of school-
ing. In a comparison of Hezbollah militants
who died in action with a random sample of
Lebanese from the same age group and region,
militants were less likely to come from poor
Fig. 3. Demonization works
both ways. (A) Demonstra-
tor’s placard outside the
Palestinian embassy in Bei-
jing vilifying the United
Nations and the United
States (April 2002). [Reu-
ters/Andrew Wong] (B) An-
ti-Moslem sign outside
Jacksonville, Florida, church
( January 2003). [Photo
courtesy of Florida Times-
Union]
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homes and more likely to have had secondary-
school education.
Nevertheless, relative loss of economic or
social advantage by educated persons might
encourage support for terrorism. In the period
leading to the first Intifada (1982–1988), the
number of Palestinian men with 12 years or
more of schooling more than doubled; those
with less schooling increased only 30%. This
coincided with a sharp increase in unemploy-
ment for college graduates relative to high
school graduates. Real daily wages of college
graduates fell some 30%; wages for those
with only secondary schooling held steady.
Underemployment also seems to be a factor
among those recruited to Al-Qaida and its
allies from the Arabian peninsula (27).
The Institutional Factor: Organizing
Fictive Kin
Although humiliation and despair may help
account for susceptibility to martyrdom in
some situations, this is neither a complete
explanation nor one applicable to other cir-
cumstances. Studies by psychologist Ariel
Merari point to the importance of institu-
tions in suicide terrorism (28). His team
interviewed 32 of 34 bomber families in
Palestine/Israel (before 1998), surviving at-
tackers, and captured recruiters. Suicide
terrorists apparently span their population’s
normal distribution in terms of education,
socioeconomic status, and personality type
(introvert vs. extrovert). Mean age for
bombers was early twenties. Almost all
were unmarried and expressed religious be-
lief before recruitment (but no more than
did the general population).
Except for being young, unattached males,
suicide bombers differ from members of
violent racist organizations with whom
they are often compared (29). Overall, sui-
cide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunc-
tional attributes (fatherless, friendless, or
jobless) or suicidal symptoms. They do not
vent fear of enemies or express “hopeless-
ness” or a sense of “nothing to lose” for
lack of life alternatives that would be con-
sistent with economic rationality. Merari
attributes primary responsibility for attacks
to recruiting organizations, which enlist
prospective candidates from this youthful
and relatively unattached population. Char-
ismatic trainers then intensely cultivate mu-
tual commitment to die within small cells
of three to six members. The final step
before a martyrdom operation is a formal
social contract, usually in the form of a
video testament.
From 1996 to 1999 Nasra Hassan, a Pa-
kistani relief worker, interviewed nearly 250
Palestinian recruiters and trainers, failed sui-
cide bombers, and relatives of deceased
bombers. Bombers were men aged 18 to 38:
“None were uneducated, desperately poor,
simple-minded, or depressed. . . . They all
seemed to be entirely normal members of
their families” (30). Yet “all were deeply
religious,” believing their actions “sanctioned
by the divinely revealed religion of Islam.”
Leaders of sponsoring organizations com-
plained, “Our biggest problem is the hordes
of young men who beat on our doors.”
Psychologist Brian Barber surveyed 900
Moslem adolescents during Gaza’s first In-
tifada (1987–1993) (31). Results show high
levels of participation in and victimization
from violence. For males, 81% reported
throwing stones, 66% suffered physical as-
sault, and 63% were shot at (versus 51, 38,
and 20% for females). Involvement in vio-
lence was not strongly correlated with
depression or antisocial behavior. Adoles-
cents most involved displayed strong indi-
vidual pride and social cohesion. This was
reflected in activities: for males, 87% de-
livered supplies to activists, 83% visited
martyred families, and 71% tended the
wounded (57, 46, and 37% for females). A
follow-up during the second Intifada
(2000 –2002) indicates that those still un-
married act in ways considered personally
more dangerous but socially more mean-
ingful. Increasingly, many view martyr acts
as most meaningful. By summer 2002, 70
to 80% of Palestinians endorsed martyr
operations (32).
Previously, recruiters scouted mosques,
schools, and refugee camps for candidates
deemed susceptible to intense religious in-
doctrination and logistical training. During
the second Intifada, there has been a surfeit of
volunteers and increasing involvement of
secular organizations (allowing women). The
frequency and violence of suicide attacks
have escalated (more bombings since Febru-
ary 2002 than during 1993–2000); planning
has been less painstaking. Despite these
changes, there is little to indicate overall
change in bomber profiles (mostly unmar-
ried, average socioeconomic status, moder-
ately religious) (28, 30).
In contrast to Palestinians, surveys with a
control group of Bosnian Moslem adoles-
cents from the same time period reveal mark-
edly weaker expressions of self-esteem, hope
for the future, and prosocial behavior (30). A
key difference is that Palestinians routinely
invoke religion to invest personal trauma
with proactive social meaning that takes in-
jury as a badge of honor. Bosnian Moslems
typically report not considering religious af-
filiation a significant part of personal or col-
lective identity until seemingly arbitrary vio-
lence forced awareness upon them.
Thus, a critical factor determining suicide
terrorism behavior is arguably loyalty to in-
timate cohorts of peers, which recruiting or-
ganizations often promote through religious
communion (supporting online text on reli-
gion’s role) (33). Consider data on 39 recruits
to Harkat al-Ansar, a Pakistani-based ally of
Al-Qaida. All were unmarried males, most
had studied the Quran. All believed that by
sacrificing themselves they would help se-
cure the future of their “family” of fictive kin:
“Each [martyr] has a special place—among
them are brothers, just as there are sons and
those even more dear” (34). A Singapore
Parliamentary report on 31 captured opera-
tives from Jemaah Islamiyah and other Al-
Qaida allies in Southeast Asia underscores
the pattern: “These men were not ignorant,
destitute or disenfranchised. All 31 had re-
ceived secular education. . . . Like many of
their counterparts in militant Islamic organi-
zations in the region, they held normal, re-
spectable jobs. . . . As a group, most of the
detainees regarded religion as their most im-
portant personal value. . . secrecy over the
true knowledge of jihad, helped create a
sense of sharing and empowerment vis-a`-vis
others.” (35).
Such sentiments characterize institutional
manipulation of emotionally driven commit-
ments that may have emerged under natural
selection’s influence to refine or override
short-term rational calculations that would
otherwise preclude achieving goals against
long odds. Most typically, such emotionally
driven commitments serve as survival mech-
anisms to inspire action in otherwise paralyz-
ing circumstances, as when a weaker person
convincingly menaces a stronger person into
thinking twice before attempting to take ad-
vantage. In religiously inspired suicide terror-
ism, however, these emotions are purposely
manipulated by organizational leaders, re-
cruiters, and trainers to benefit the organiza-
tion rather than the individual (supporting
online text on religion) (36).
Rational Choice Is the Sponsor’s
Prerogative, Not the Agent’s
Little tangible benefit (in terms of rational-
choice theories) accrues to the suicide bomb-
er, certainly not enough to make the likely
gain one of maximized “expected utility.”
Heightened social recognition occurs only
after death, obviating personal material ben-
efit. But for leaders who almost never con-
sider killing themselves (despite declarations
of readiness to die), material benefits more
likely outweigh losses in martyrdom opera-
tions. Hassan cites one Palestinian official’s
prescription for a successful mission: “a will-
ing young man. . . nails, gunpowder, a light
switch and a short cable, mercury (readily
obtainable from thermometers), acetone
. . . . The most expensive item is transporta-
tion to an Israeli town” (30). The total cost is
about $150.
For the sponsoring organization, suicide
bombers are expendable assets whose losses
generate more assets by expanding public
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support and pools of potential recruits. Short-
ly after 9/11, an intelligence survey of edu-
cated Saudis (ages 25 to 41) concluded that
95% supported Al-Qaida (37). In a December
2002 Pew Research Center survey on grow-
ing anti-Americanism, only 6% of Egyptians
viewed America and its “War on Terror”
favorably (38). Money flows from those will-
ing to let others die, easily offsetting opera-
tional costs (training, supporting personnel,
safe houses, explosives and other arms, trans-
portation, and communication). After a
Jerusalem supermarket bombing by an 18-
year-old Palestinian female, a Saudi telethon
raised more than $100 million for “the Al-
Quds Intifada.”
Massive retaliation further increases
people’s sense of victimization and readi-
ness to behave according to organizational
doctrines and policies structured to take
advantage of such feelings. In a poll of
1179 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in
spring 2002, 66% said army operations
increased their backing for suicide bomb-
ings (39). By year’s end, 73% of Lebanese
Moslems considered suicide bombings
justifiable (38). This radicalization of opin-
ion increases both demand and supply for
martyrdom operations. A December 2002
UN report credited volunteers with swell-
ing a reviving Al-Qaida in 40 countries
(40). The organization’s influence in the
larger society—most significantly its di-
recting elites—increases in turn.
Priorities for Homeland Security
The last line of defense against suicide ter-
rorism—preventing bombers from reaching
targets—may be the most expensive and least
likely to succeed. Random bag or body
searches cannot be very effective against peo-
ple willing to die, although this may provide
some semblance of security and hence psy-
chological defense against suicide terrorism’s
psychological warfare. A middle line of de-
fense, penetrating and destroying recruiting
organizations and isolating their leaders, may
be successful in the near term, but even more
resistant organizations could emerge instead.
The first line of defense is to drastically
reduce receptivity of potential recruits to re-
cruiting organiza-
tions. But how?
It is important to
know what probably
will not work. Rais-
ing literacy rates may
have no effect and
could be counterpro-
ductive should great-
er literacy translate
into greater exposure
to terrorist propagan-
da (in Pakistan, liter-
acy and dislike for
the United States in-
creased as the num-
ber of religious ma-
drasa schools in-
creased from 3000 to
39,000 since 1978)
(27, 38). Lessening
poverty may have no
effect, and could be
counterproductive if
poverty reduction for
the entire population amounted to a down-
ward redistribution of wealth that left those
initially better off with fewer opportunities
than before. Ending occupation or reducing
perceived humiliation may help, but not if the
population believes this to be a victory in-
spired by terror (e.g., Israel’s apparently
forced withdrawal from Lebanon).
If suicide-bombing is crucially (though not
exclusively) an institution-level phenomenon, it
may require finding the right mix of pressure and
inducements to get the communities themselves
to abandon support for institutions that recruit
suicide attackers. One way is to so damage the
community’s social and political fabric that any
support by the local population or authorities for
sponsors of suicide attacks collapses, as hap-
pened regarding the kamikaze as a by-product of
the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki. In the present world, however, such a
strategy would neither be morally justifiable nor
practical to implement, given the dispersed and
distributed organization of terrorist institutions
among distantly separated populations that col-
lectively number in the hundreds of millions.
Likewise, retaliation in kind (“tit-for-tat”) is not
morally acceptable if allies are sought (41). Even
in more localized settings, such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, coercive policies alone may
not achieve lasting relief from attack and can
exacerbate the problem over time. On the in-
ducement side, social psychology research indi-
cates that people who identify with antagonistic
groups use conflicting information from the oth-
er group to reinforce antagonism (19). Thus,
simply trying to persuade others from without by
bombarding them with more self-serving infor-
mation may only increase hostility.
Other research suggests that most peo-
ple have more moderate views than what
they consider their group norm to be. Incit-
ing and empowering moderates from within
to confront inadequacies and inconsisten-
cies in their own knowledge (of others as
evil), values (respect for life), and behavior
(support for killing), and other members of
their group (42), can produce emotional dis-
satisfaction leading to lasting change and in-
fluence on the part of these individuals (43).
Funding for civic education and debate may
help, also interfaith confidence-building
through intercommunity interaction initiatives
(as Singapore’s government proposes) (35).
Ethnic profiling, isolation, and preemptive at-
tack on potential (but not yet actual) supporters
of terrorism probably will not help. Another
strategy is for the United States and its allies to
change behavior by directly addressing and
lessening sentiments of grievance and humilia-
tion, especially in Palestine (where images of
daily violence have made it the global focus of
Moslem attention) (44) (Fig. 4). For no evi-
dence (historical or otherwise) indicates that
support for suicide terrorism will evaporate
without complicity in achieving at least some
fundamental goals that suicide bombers and
supporting communities share.
Of course, this does not mean negotiating
over all goals, such as Al-Qaida’s quest to
replace the Western-inspired system of
nation-states with a global caliphate, first in
Moslem lands and then everywhere (see sup-
porting online text for history and agenda of
suicide-sponsoring groups). Unlike other
groups, Al-Qaida publicizes no specific de-
mands after martyr actions. As with an
avenging army, it seeks no compromise. But
most people who currently sympathize with it
might.
Perhaps to stop the bombing we need re-
search to understand which configurations of
psychological and cultural relationships are lur-
ing and binding thousands, possibly millions, of
mostly ordinary people into the terrorist orga-
nization’s martyr-making web. Study is needed
on how terrorist institutions form and on simi-
larities and differences across organizational
structures, recruiting practices, and populations
recruited. Are there reliable differences be-
tween religious and secular groups, or between
ideologically driven and grievance-driven ter-
rorism? Interviews with surviving Hamas
bombers and captured Al-Qaida operatives sug-
gest that ideology and grievance are factors for
Fig. 4. Moslem youth with Quran dressed as a Palestinian suicide bomber
demonstrating outside the United Nations ofﬁce in Jakarta, Indonesia
(April 2002). (Indonesia is the most populous Moslem nation.) [Reuters/
Darren Whiteside]
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both groups but relative weights and conse-
quences may differ.
We also need to investigate any significant
causal relations between our society’s policies
and actions and those of terrorist organizations
and supporters. We may find that the global
economic, political, and cultural agenda of our
own society has a catalyzing role in moves to
retreat from our world view (Taliban) or to
create a global counterweight (Al-Qaida).
Funding such research may be difficult. As with
the somewhat tendentious and self-serving use
of “terror” as a policy concept (45), to reduce
dissonance our governments and media may
wish to ignore these relations as legitimate top-
ics for inquiry into what terrorism is all about
and why it exists.
This call for research may demand more
patience than any administration could politi-
cally tolerate during times of crisis. In the long
run, however, our society can ill afford to ig-
nore either the consequences of its own actions
or the causes behind the actions of others. Po-
tential costs of such ignorance are terrible to
contemplate. The comparatively minor expense
of research into such consequences and causes
could have inestimable benefit.
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